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I.  COOPERATION IS THE WATCH WORD OF THE DAY 
 
[1]  A fundamental tenet of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (the “2006 Amendments”) is the notion that parties can 
agree and cooperate on issues relating to electronic discovery.  Many of 
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the rule changes now either require parties to meet and confer about 
electronic discovery or presuppose a certain level of dialogue between the 
parties regarding such issues. 
 
[2]  Rule 26, for example, which mandates the first live meeting between 
the parties, states that the “attorneys of record . . . are jointly responsible 
for . . . attempting in good faith to agree to the proposed discovery 
plan….”1  The discovery plan, in turn, must address the parties’ “views 
and proposals on . . . any issues about disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it 
should be produced.”2  Likewise, Rule 16(b) has permitted the courts’ 
scheduling order to “provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically 
stored information” and to “include any agreements the parties reach for 
asserting claims of privilege . . . after information is produced.”3   
 
[3]  Against this backdrop of anticipated cooperation, the criteria for 
resolving disputes remain fundamentally the same.  As in prior versions of 
the Rules, the court may limit the frequency or extent of discovery after 
taking into consideration whether “the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, 
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues.”4  
 
[4]  Although balancing the burden and expense of discovery with its 
likely benefit is certainly not a novel concept, it takes on a much higher 
level of significance when dealing with electronically-stored information 
(“ESI”).  More importantly, this balancing can have a profound effect on 
lawyers responsible for the zealous representation of their clients.  The 
incentives for striking a balance regarding electronic discovery depend, in 
large part, on how much discovery a party is likely to face.  Good faith 
negotiations, cooperation, and bipartisan agreement can play an important 
and productive role in governing the conduct of parties when each party is 
faced with the prospect of costly electronic discovery.   However, in civil 
                                                 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2)(3)(C). 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii-iv). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
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disputes where one side has a significantly higher volume of ESI, such as 
in employment litigation, the incentive for bilateral cooperation on 
discovery issues is significantly diminished.   
 
[5]  In commercial litigation involving corporate entities, both parties 
usually have substantial (or at least comparable) volumes of potentially 
relevant ESI.  Accordingly, both sides have an incentive to agree on 
methods for controlling the cost of preserving, searching, and producing 
discoverable information.  Parties with equivalent volumes of ESI are 
more likely to reach a détente regarding such issues as the scope of 
production, the form of production, recovery of inadvertently produced 
privileged information, and similar issues. 
 
[6]  Employment litigation, in contrast, usually involves one or more 
individuals suing an employer or former employer.  Even in class or 
collective actions, where large numbers of potential class members may be 
involved, the plaintiff class is a group of individual employees and the 
defendant is, most often, the organization that employed them.  As a 
result, the corporate defendant is likely to have a much greater volume of 
ESI with which to contend. 
 
[7]  Employers usually have significantly larger volumes of ESI in their 
possession that may be relevant to the litigation.  Even if the body of truly 
irrelevant information turns out to be substantially smaller, it is usually 
true that the potential universe of relevant ESI is much greater for the 
employer than the employee.  For example, electronic mail messages 
regarding the employee are more likely to be kept on the employer’s 
server.5  Information regarding the reasons for the employment action at 
issue, such as a reduction in force, is almost always in the possession of 
the employer.6  Employers maintain personnel databases which may 
contain potentially discoverable information in disparate impact cases, i.e. 
when one or more employees allege that a neutral employment action had 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing that 
an employer’s e-mail servers, including optical disk and tape backups, likely contained 
electronic mail messages relating to the plaintiff in a discrimination matter, and ordering 
sample of backup tapes to be restored and searched for discovery purposes). 
6 See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005) 
(requiring defendant employer to produce ESI, along with embedded metadata, 
associated with Sprint/United’s decision making process during reduction in force). 
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a disproportionate impact on certain categories of individuals on account 
of age, race, gender, or some other protected characteristic.7  Indeed, with 
the limited exception of certain diaries, journals, memos created by the 
employee, or correspondence directly to or from the employee, the vast 
majority of relevant ESI in employment litigation will likely reside with 
the employer. 
 
[8]  The difficulty lies in balancing the need to discover potentially 
relevant information with the risk of one party having unfair leverage over 
the other.  The former is, of course, required for litigation to be objectively 
decided on the facts.  The latter is a concern when the inherent costs of 
electronic discovery systemically force one party to either resolve cases 
that would otherwise be decided on the merits, or resolve them at a higher 
price because electronic discovery is inevitable.  This concern does not 
presuppose or require any inappropriate or unethical behavior on the part 
of employees or their counsel.  Indeed, the cost of litigation has always 
been a factor in determining whether to settle, and lawyers have a duty to 
be honest with their adversary in discussing material facts of the case, 
including the potential cost of discovery.8   
 
[9]  The systemic concerns exist, however, in light of the 2006 
Amendments and the increased preeminence of electronic discovery in 
civil litigation.  As a result, those costs are much higher than they used to 
be.9  In employment litigation, the risks are magnified because electronic 
discovery costs may quickly dwarf the value of the litigation itself, as 
measured by potential damages.  Compensatory and punitive damages in 
Title VII cases, for example, are limited to $300,000.10   The median jury 
verdict for discrimination cases nationwide, based on research of matters 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2004). 
8 See, e.g., Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp.,212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Md. 2002) 
(discussing an attorney’s obligation to avoid material misrepresentations in the context of 
settlement obligations). 
9 Zubulake,  217 F.R.D. at 311 (“As individuals and corporations increasingly do 
business electronically . . . the universe of discoverable material has expanded 
exponentially.  The more information there is to discover, the more expensive it is to 
discovery all the relevant information. . . .”). 
10 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 3 
 
 5
between 2000 and 2006, was $200,000.11  The median settlement amount 
was even lower – $70,000.12  The combination of relatively modest case 
valuations with significantly increased electronic discovery costs may 
have a profound – and perhaps unintended – impact on the resolution of 
employment related litigation.  Although not limited to employment cases, 
one study has already found that one in five corporate respondents have 
settled litigation to avoid the costs of electronic discovery.13 
 
[10]  Given the economic realities of employment litigation, therefore, it is 
instructional to review the cost shifting criteria associated with electronic 
discovery both before and after the 2006 Amendments. 
 
II.  BEFORE THE 2006 AMENDMENTS 
 
[11]  One of the seminal cases addressing cost shifting for electronic 
discovery before the 2006 Amendments was Zubulake v. UBS Warburg.14   
In this gender discrimination and retaliation case, the court analyzed 
whether an employer had an obligation to search backup tapes for e-mails 
related to the plaintiff, and evaluated who had to pay for the cost of those 
searches.  In analyzing these questions, the court established a seven factor 
test for determining whether cost shifting should occur in the context of 
electronic discovery: 
 
(1)  The extent to which the request is specifically tailored 
to discover relevant information. 
 
(2)  The availability of information from other sources. 
 
(3)  The total cost of the production, compared to the 
amount in controversy. 
 
                                                 
11 JVD Releases Its New Study of Employment Practice Liability Trends and Statistics for 
2007, EMP. PRAC. LIABILITY VERDICTS AND SETTLEMENTS, Nov. 2007, LRP 
Publications, at 2. 
12 Jury Verdict Research Study Yields Statistics Analyzing Settlement Claims, EMP. PRAC. 
LIABILITY VERDICTS AND SETTLEMENTS, Oct. 2007, LRP Publications, at 2. 
13 THE AMENDED FRCP:  ONE YEAR LATER 3 (Fortiva 2007) (available by request at 
www.fortiva.com). 
14 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311 
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(4)  The total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party. 
 
(5)  The relative ability of each party to control costs and its 
incentive to do so. 
 
(6)  The importance of issues at stake in the litigation. 
 
(7)  Relative benefits of the parties obtaining the 
information.15   
 
[12]  The court also determined that these factors should not be weighed 
equally, but instead they should be weighed in descending order of 
importance, with numbers (1) and (2) being the most important, (3), (4) 
and (5) being the next group, and (6) and (7) being independent groups of 
lesser importance.16 
 
[13]  Despite the relative appearance of objectivity in the seven factor test, 
it tips decidedly against employers in employment litigation.   
 
[14]  The first factor, the extent to which a request is specifically tailored 
to discover relevant information, fails to account for the fundamental costs 
of electronic discovery, even in responding to a narrowly tailored 
discovery request.  For example, the document request at issue in 
Zubulake was that the defendant produce “all documents [including ESI] 
concerning any communication by or between UBS employees concerning 
plaintiff.”17  In an employment case alleging gender discrimination and 
retaliation with regard to the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s 
employment, it would appear that the request for “all communications 
                                                 
15 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D at 322.  The “new” seven factor test was actually a modified test 
from a prior opinion in the same court.  See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris 
Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  Interestingly, one of the factors 
added to the cost shifting test by the Zubulake court was consideration of the “amount in 
controversy” in the litigation.  Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 321.  Initially, this would appear 
to balance some of the concerns relating to high discovery costs in low-value 
employment cases.  However, as discussed infra, the placement of this factor in the 
overall hierarchy of the Zubulake test all but negates its balancing effect. 
16 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D.. at 322-23. 
17 Id. at 312. 
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concerning the plaintiff” is, in fact, fairly narrowly tailored.  However, in 
the electronic age, “all communications” includes all electronic mail 
messages, which may encompass evidence located only on backup tapes.  
Such information may be costly to restore and search, as was evidenced by 
UBS’s estimate that the cost of producing the emails on its backup tapes 
would be approximately $300,000.18  Thus the cost of fully responding to 
a single document request would actually have matched the statutory cap 
on compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII.19  Herein lies the 
flaw in giving preeminence to the first Zubulake factor: Even a narrowly 
tailored request for information may be so cost-intensive as to surpass the 
overall value of the litigation in question. 
 
[15]  The second factor in Zubulake, the availability of information from 
other sources, also cuts consistently against the employer.  As discussed 
above, the availability of information from other sources is virtually 
meaningless in employment litigation, because the vast body of ESI will 
ordinarily rest with the employer.  Personnel records, aggregated 
employment data, and electronic communication regarding relevant topics 
will, for a variety of reasons most likely reside on the employer’s 
computers or the employer’s network.  Moreover, this information will be 
exclusive to the employer.  Again, to use Zubulake as an example, the 
plaintiff had independently retained over 450 e-mails that either 
mentioned her by name or related in some way to her employment.20  
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had actually retained more electronic 
communication than the defendant (at least with respect to its live 
electronic systems), the court assumed that other relevant e-mails existed 
exclusively in the employer’s backup tapes, stating “[c]learly, numerous 
responsive e-mails had been created and deleted at UBS, and Zubulake 
wanted them.”21  Thus, when applying the second factor in the cost-
shifting test, information will frequently be available only from the 
employer’s data systems, even where the employee has collected and 
retained a subset of such information on his or her own. 
 
                                                 
18 Id. at 313. 
19 Although Zubulake sued under New York Civil Rights law and the Administrative 
Code of the City of New York, which do not have comparable caps, for comparison 
purposes the analogy remains valid. 
20 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 313. 
21 Id. 
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[16]  Likewise, two of the next three factors also weigh heavily against 
employers.  The fourth factor, the total cost of production compared to the 
resources available to each party, flatly applies the “David versus Goliath” 
rule and penalizes the employer for having greater resources than the 
employee.  Rarely, if ever, would those tables be turned and would this 
factor weigh in favor of shifting the costs of production to the employee.   
 
[17]  The fifth factor, the relative ability of each party to control costs and 
its incentive to do so, is at best a two-edged sword.  As discussed above, 
even when faced with even a reasonable discovery request, full 
compliance on the part of an employer might require a significant 
expenditure of costs despite the best efforts to curtail the same.  In 
contrast, an employee with little or no ESI at his or her disposal has little 
or no incentive to control costs associated with electronic discovery.  As 
individuals, employees may have, at most, a personal computer with 
potentially relevant information, and one or more online accounts, such as 
an electronic mail account provided by a public internet service provider.  
Employees, therefore, need not confront the significant expense associated 
with searching data networks, servers, e-mail archives and backup tapes in 
responding to discovery. 
 
[18]  The purpose for the seven-factor test is both legitimate and 
admirable.  In analyzing whether cost shifting should be considered, the 
Zubulake court framed the issue against the backdrop of disparate 
resources in employment litigation: 
 
Courts must remember that cost shifting may effectively 
end discovery, especially when private parties are engaged 
in litigation with large corporations.  As large companies 
increasingly move to entirely paper-free environments, the 
frequent use of cost-shifting as well will have the effect of 
crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases.  
Both undermine the “strong public policy in resolving 
disputes on their merits” and may ultimately deter the filing 
of potentially meritorious claims.22 
 
                                                 
22 Id. at 317-318. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 3 
 
 9
[19]  While this public policy concern is without a doubt legitimate, the 
seven factor test that resulted from Zubulake allows the pendulum to 
swing too far in the opposite direction.  When the majority of the factors 
deemed most important are inherently adverse to the employer, even 
assuming good faith discovery practices on the part of the plaintiff, the 
potential impact on litigation is significant and dangerous.  Even 
employers involved in cases with little or no evidence of liability, but 
nevertheless faced with several hundred thousands of dollars in discovery 
costs, may quickly conclude that settlement of a meritless claim is a better 
option than incurring those costs.   
 
III.  THE 2006 RULE CHANGES 
 
[20]  Against the backdrop of the Zubulake decision, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were amended, effective December 2006.  In the context 
of cost shifting, perhaps the most important rule is Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  Rule 
26 indicates that a party “need not provide discovery of electronically 
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”23  Further, the Rule provides 
that the court may deny a discovery demand if: 
 
a)  It is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from another source that is more convenient, 
less burdensome, or less expensive; 
 
b)  The parties seeking discovery had had ample 
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the 
information sought; or 
 
c)  The burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation.24 
 
                                                 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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[21]  This Rule carries over two of the fundamental problems (at least 
from the employer’s perspective) from the Zubulake seven-factor test.25  
First, the Rule relies on an undefined distinction between accessible and 
inaccessible ESI.  Therefore, courts will more likely continue to look to 
the analysis in Zubulake because it remains one of the most 
comprehensive discussions on the topic.   
 
[22]  That discussion, however, simply assumes that employers should 
bear the cost of searching any accessible data in their possession.26  At 
first glance, this would seem to comport with the language of the new 
Rule 26.  However, the Zubulake court effectively concluded that the only 
truly inaccessible data is either tape backup or fragmented or damaged 
data.27  Thus, with the limited exception of tape backups, the entire 
universe of electronic mail, including locally archived mail messages such 
as .pst files, is considered accessible.  This definition, however, may be far 
too broad, especially in light of the actual language of Rule 26.   
 
[23]  The Zubulake decision makes distinctions between accessible and 
inaccessible based purely on the technological methods used for 
retrieval.28  The amended Rule 26, however, protects parties from having 
to produce any ESI that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.”29  It is quite conceivable, even likely, that a party will be 
unable to access certain categories of ESI because of the “undue burden or 
cost” even when those categories do not fall within one of the two narrow 
categories of “inaccessible” ESI defined by Zubulake.   
 
[24]  An employer, for example, who is asked to produce all electronic 
mail messages about certain employees, may be faced with the prospect of 
searching through thousands of local e-mail archive files (such as .pst files 
created by Microsoft Outlook).  Although some of these files may be 
contained on the employer’s network, they may also be located on local 
drives, CD or DVD recordable media, or other locations.  Because of the 
                                                 
25 In fact, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) was not changed by the 2006 Amendments. 
26 Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320 (“For these sources of e-mails – active mail files and e-
mails stored on optical disks – it would be wholly inappropriate to even consider cost-
shifting.”   
27 Id. at 319-320. 
28 Id. 
29FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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sheer volume of the possible universe of ESI that must be searched, it is 
possible that such information is not “reasonably accessible” to that 
employer because of the “undue burden or cost” associated with retrieving 
it.  Under those circumstances, the employer ought to at least be able to 
argue that the court should consider shifting some of the cost to the 
requesting party.  However, under the Zubulake analysis, the court would 
not even consider cost shifting because the data in question is not 
damaged, fragmented or located on backup tapes.  Thus, to avoid further 
disparity in allocating the costs of electronic discovery, courts must be 
prepared to take a broader view of accessible versus inaccessible within 
the meaning of Rule 26. 
 
[25]  Second, even if an employer can show that certain ESI is not 
reasonably accessible, it will still be forced to overcome some, if not all, 
of the Zubulake seven factor test to justify cost shifting.  The Zubulake test 
was ostensibly derived from the existing rule at the time, which included 
the discussion of the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and 
most significantly, the parties’ resources.   That portion of the Rule did not 
change in December of 2006.  Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that 
courts will continue to look to the seven factor test articulated in Zubulake 
to determine whether cost shifting is appropriate.30  For the reasons cited 
above, the rote application of this test risks a significant disproportionate 
impact on larger entities, such as employers, when compared to individual 
adversaries with very little ESI in their custody or control. 
 
[26]  Quinby v. Westlb AG further demonstrates this point.31  In Quinby, a 
former director of a securities firm brought gender discrimination and 
retaliation claims against her former employer.32 The plaintiff initially 
submitted a request for production seeking a search of nineteen employee 
and former employees’ email accounts for references to the plaintiff 
specifically and sexist content generally.33  Following the defendant’s 
objections, the court limited the number of e-mail accounts to seventeen, 
                                                 
30 In re: Veeco Instruments, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23926 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 2, 2007) 
(acknowledging the 2006 Rule Amendments but nevertheless, relying on the Zubulake 
factors in cost shifting analysis). 
31 Quinby v. West LB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
32 Id. at 96. 
33 Id. at 98. 
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as well as the time period for some of those accounts.34  In order to obtain 
the emails, the defendant hired a consultant to restore and search its 
backup tapes.35  The consultant charged the defendant a total of 
$226,266.60, which included a 25% premium for expediting the work.36  
The defendant moved to shift those costs to the plaintiff.37  The plaintiff 
opposed, arguing that because of its preservation obligations, the 
defendant needed to have preserved the relevant documents in an 
accessible format once it reasonably anticipated litigation, and therefore, 
was not entitled to cost shifting as a threshold matter.38  Then, the court 
agreed as to the majority of the e-mail accounts, because they involved 
employees who worked for the company during and after the initiation of 
the company’s preservation obligations.39   
 
[27]  The court then applied the Zubulake factors to determine the 
appropriateness of cost shifting for the e-mail account of employees who 
left prior to the obligation.  As to the first two Zubulake factors, specific 
tailoring and availability from other sources, the court upon review found 
that the plaintiff’s sampling of relevant emails was too low to be 
considered specifically tailored, especially when compared to the vast 
number of documents ultimately produced from a search of the affected 
account, and in spite of the fact the documents were not available from 
another source.40 As to the next three Zubulake factors – amount in 
controversy compared to cost of production, total cost compared to party 
resources, and ability and incentives of the parties to control costs-- the 
court noted that a) the plaintiff had the potential to receive a multi-million 
dollar recovery in the case, which weighed against cost shifting; b) that the 
employer’s assets in the billions of dollars weighed against costs shifting, 
and c) that because the plaintiff requested a broad search, she had some 
control over the cost, and therefore, this factor “slightly” weighed in favor 
of cost shifting.41   As to the sixth factor, importance of issues at stake, the 
court analogized the case specifically to Zubulake, which held that 
                                                 
34 Id. at 99. 
35 Id. at 100. 
36 Id. at 101. 
37 Id. at 99. 
38 Id. at 103. 
39 Id. at 105-06. 
40 Id. at 109. 
41 Id. at 109-110. 
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discrimination claims were “hardly unique,” making the factor “neutral” to 
the cost shifting analysis.42 As to the seventh and “least important” factor, 
the court concluded that because the plaintiff had more to gain, the factor 
weighed in favor of cost shifting.43  The court ultimately determined that 
the factors favored cost shifting as to the emails stemming from the period 
prior to the preservation obligation.  Even then, however, the court stated 
that, “[e]ven where cost-shifting is granted, the defendant must still pay 
for the majority of the production because of the presumption that the 
responding party pays for its discovery cost.” 44 Again, the court cited 
Zubulake, noting that because the plaintiff’s requested searches in the 
present case were broader than those in Zubulake, and in Zubulake 25% of 
the cost was shifted, shifting 30% of the cost of producing the e-mails 
prior to preservation obligation was appropriate.45   
 
[28]  Thus, in Quinby, even with a favorable ruling on cost shifting, the 
costs for production fell more heavily on the employer. 
 
IV.  THE COST OF COMPLIANCE 
 
[29]  Finally, certain aspects of the 2006 Amendments may also risk a 
disproportionate cost allocation even before litigation begins.  Rule 37 
provides an often-touted “safe harbor” for the destruction of ESI that is the 
result of “routine, good faith operation of an electronic information 
system.”46  Ostensibly, this provision benefits employers because it creates 
a potential defense in the event of the destruction of ESI.  However, the 
effect is likely to force employers to expend significant sums in 
developing and implementing document retention and destruction policies.  
Individual employees, on the other hand, face no equivalent obligation.  
Generally, a preservation obligation by an individual employee can be met 
by simply turning off his or her computer, or at worst, creating a forensic 
copy of his or her hard drive.  The implications for employers are 
significantly more complex. 
 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 110. 
44 Id. at 111. 
45 Id. 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(3). 
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[30]  Broccoli v. Echostar47 illustrates the dangers employers face when 
they fail to meet these preservation obligations. In Broccoli, an employee 
brought multiple claims against his former employer, alleging sex 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, as well as Maryland state 
wage payment, breach of contract, and tortious interference claims.  The 
jury found in favor of the employer on the Title VII and tortious 
interference claims and awarded a modest amount to the plaintiff on the 
remaining state law claims.48   
 
[31]  During discovery, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions based on 
the employer’s alleged failure to preserve critical employment documents, 
in particular, those relating to the plaintiff’s November 2001 termination 
and those relating to a reduction in force that the employer provided as the 
bona fide reason for the termination.49  The plaintiff asserted that the 
preservation obligation began in January 2001, when he made oral and 
email complaints to two of his supervisors about the alleged sexually 
harassing behavior of a human resource manager.50  The plaintiff stated he 
complained again in July 2001 to a more senior member of human 
resources, and again in November 2001 in conjunction with his 
termination.51  The defendant asserted that it had no knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s complaints until December 2001, when senior executives 
received a letter from the plaintiff’s girlfriend alleging that the plaintiff’s 
termination was discriminatory, and therefore, had no obligation to 
suspend its ordinary practice of purging deleted e-mails twenty-one days 
and personnel files thirty days after termination.52   
 
[32]  The court disagreed, citing Zubulake and holding that the employer 
was on notice of the pending litigation and therefore, had a duty to 
preserve, beginning in January 2001 when the plaintiff first complained to 
his supervisors.53  The court stated that “[g]iven Echostar’s status as a 
large public corporation with ample financial resources and personnel 
management know-how, the court finds it indefensible that such basic 
                                                 
47 Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’n Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005). 
48 Id at 508-509. 
49 Id. at 509. 
50 Id. at 510-511. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 511. 
53 Id. 
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personnel procedures and related documentation were lacking.”54  
Accordingly, the court awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees associated with 
discovery to the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff had actually lost on the 
underlying Title VII claims. This amount was almost twice that of the jury 
award for state wage payment law claims.55 
 
[33]  This decision highlights the potential costs of electronic discovery 
compared to the actual value of an employment litigation claim.  It also 
demonstrates the unique risks to corporations when the notice of 
threatened litigation comes from a current employee.  As the Broccoli 
court seems to suggest, one employee complaining to two supervisors 
about his treatment can, under certain circumstances, put the entire 
corporation on sufficient notice to require preservation of potentially 
relevant ESI.  To achieve the level of “corporate readiness” required to 
meet such preservation obligations, corporate employers are now forced to 
establish complex and costly legal hold procedures.  Again, because of the 
disparate nature of electronic discovery in the employment context, 
employees are usually not saddled with such burdens.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[34]  It is important that discovery rules avoid the systemic effect of 
chilling discovery by either party.  However, this concept, grounded on the 
notion that litigation should be based on the facts equal and known to all 
parties, cuts both ways.  The cost shifting analysis in Zubulake, which will 
likely continue to have a profound effect under the amended Federal 
Rules, forces employers to bear the brunt of discovery costs.  Because the 
value of employment cases may be lower compared to these costs, the 
result may cause a chilling effect on employers.  While frequent cost 
shifting may have the undesirable effect of chilling plaintiffs from 
bringing litigation against their employers, the opposite risk should not be 
ignored.   
 
                                                 
54 Id. at 512. 
55 Id at 513-14. 
